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Imperial Myths between Nationalism and Communism: Appropriations of 
Imperial Legacies in the North-eastern Adriatic during the Early Cold War1 
 
Sabina Mihelj 
 
Abstract: In contemporary scholarly discussions, political uses of imperial pasts are typically 
associated with the rise of modern national states and nationalist principles of identity 
formation. Although clearly important, this approach can lead us to neglect the appropriations 
of imperial myths based on other types of ideological frameworks. In communist Eastern 
Europe, official representations of the past followed the imperatives of a historical-materialist 
vision of history, which, at least in its initial form, necessitated a rejection of both imperialism 
and nationalism. It is therefore reasonable to expect that communist appropriations of 
imperial legacies were significantly different from those found in Western Europe at the time. 
The article examines these different uses of imperial pasts – informed by either communism 
or nationalism or both – by focusing on the competing perceptions of imperial history and 
heritage at the Italo-Yugoslav border during the early Cold War. 
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The last wave of nation-state-building, which swept away the multinational 
federations of Eastern Europe, prompted a renewed interest in nation-formation and 
nationalist myth-making. Much as their historical predecessors, these modern-day 
nation-builders frequently resorted to imperial legacies to buttress their territorial 
claims and demarcate themselves from their immediate neighbours. The nationalist 
elites of the newly independent national states across Eastern Europe often referred to 
divergent imperial legacies – Habsburg, Ottoman, Russian – to explain the persistence 
of cultural differences that separated them from their immediate neighbours, and 
presumably prevented them from functioning under a common political roof.2 Yet the 
prominence of nationalist myth-making in this recent wave of European state building 
                                                 
1 This paper draws on research funded by the British Academy, grant reference SG-43957. 
2
 See e.g. Graham Smith, Vivien Law, Andrew Wilson, Annette Bohr, Edward Allworth, Nation-
building in the Post-Soviet Borderlands: The Politics of National Identities (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998); Pål Kolstø (ed.), Myths and Boundaries in South-Eastern Europe (London: 
Hurst & Co., 2005). 
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 2 
can lead us to neglect the constructions of imperial pasts based on alternative 
principles of sovereignty and identity-formation. For almost half a century, much of 
the European continent followed the imperatives of a historical-materialist vision of 
history, which, at least in its initial form, necessitated a rejection of both imperialism 
and nationalism. Although communist leaders regularly resorted to nationalist myths 
and symbols to boost their legitimacy,3 communist attitudes to imperialism followed 
ideological frameworks significantly different from those characteristic of nationalist 
myth-making.  
 
This article aims to provide an insight into these diverse uses of imperial legacies by 
examining public representations of imperial history and heritage in the north-eastern 
Adriatic4 during the early Cold War period. Over the past two millennia, the region 
had seen the rise and fall of the Roman, Byzantine, Frankish, Holy Roman, Venetian 
and Habsburg empires. This succession of imperial administrations left behind 
multiple imperial legacies, which provided fertile grounds for subsequent border 
disputes. From the nineteenth century onwards, the establishment of nationalizing 
states gave rise to territorial claims based on nationalist principles, which sought to 
make state borders coincide with cultural and ethnic boundaries. In an ethnically and 
culturally mixed area such as the north-eastern Adriatic, the imposition of nationalist 
principles was bound to trigger conflicting visions of identity and competing demands 
for the same territory.5 On the one hand, supporters of the newly formed Italian 
national state sought o appropriate the multicultural Venetian and Roman past of the 
north-eastern Adriatic as essentially Italian. On the other hand, Slovenian, Croatian 
and Yugoslav claims to the same territory rejected the imperial heritage as alien, or 
claimed selected elements as their own. Imperial legacies thus provided cultural 
                                                 
3
 E.g. David Brandenberger, National Bolshevism: Stalinist Mass Culture and the Formation of 
Modern Russian National Identity, 1931-1956 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002); 
Bradley F. Abrams, The Struggle for the Soul of the Nation: Czech Culture and the Rise of Communism 
(Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004); Martin Mevius, Agents of Moscow: The Hungarian 
Communist Party and the Origins of Socialist Patriotism, 1941-1953 (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2005). 
4
 Among Italians, the region is known as the Julian Venetia (Venezia Giulia), while Slovenians and 
Croats refer to it as the Julian March (Julijska krajina).  
5
 For an overview of the history of the region, with a focus on the impact of nationalist principles of 
identity- and border-formation, see Marina Cattaruzza, L’Italia e il confline orientale (Bologna: Il 
Mulino, 2007). 
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materials to be selectively incorporated, whether by means of rejection or 
appropriation, into national myths of origins and national identity narratives.6  
 
However, modern political uses of imperial legacies in the North-eastern Adriatic 
cannot be reduced to nationalist frames of reference alone. As Glenda Sluga argued, 
the ethnic and cultural complexities of the North-eastern Adriatic inspired principles 
of sovereignty border legitimation that perceived cultural diversity as an asset to be 
preserved rather than an obstacle to be eliminated.7 On the Italian side, and more 
broadly among Western observers, the Cold War confrontation gradually pushed 
these alternative solutions to border disputes in the region beyond the margins of 
acceptable, associating them with totalitarian ambitions of the communist East. On 
the other side of the Iron Curtain, however, models of sovereignty and identity 
marginalised in the West assumed centre-stage. At least initially, communist 
principles of sovereignty and identity formation were sharply opposed to nationalism 
and strongly rooted in notions of proletarian internationalism, and hence intrinsically 
compatible with culturally and ethnically diverse states. 
 
We should note that at the same time, the West was undergoing a profound 
transformation which led to a progressive weakening of nationalist principles: defence 
of the nation was becoming subordinated to supranational integration and defence of 
‘the Free World’.8 In socialist countries, almost the reverse was taking place: loyalty 
to the international alliance of working peoples was gradually giving way to national 
attachments, and internationalism itself was turning into a form of nationalism.9 
Despite the constant emphasis on the incompatibility of communism and nationalism, 
                                                 
6
 For similar uses of imperial legacies in other post-imperial settings see e.g. L. Carl Brown (ed.), 
Imperial Legacy: The Ottoman Imprint on the Balkans and the Middle East (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1996); Karen Barkey and Mark Von Hagen (eds.), After Empire: Multiethnic 
Societies and Nation-Building (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997).   
7
 Glenda Sluga, The Problem of Trieste and the Italo-Yugoslav Border: Difference, Identity and 
Sovereignty in Twentieth-Century Europe (New York: SUNY Press, 2001). 
8
 Perry Anderson, ‘Internationalism: A Breviary,’ New Left Review 14 (March-April 2002): 16ff. 
9
 Ibid. The rise of communism itself of course owes a great deal to the manipulation of nationalist 
aspirations, condoned by both Marx and Lenin as an acceptable means of furthering the communist 
cause in prerevolutionary societies. Yet contrary to the expectations of Leninist national policy, 
communist revolutions proved unable to diffuse national sentiments. See Walker Connor, The National 
Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984). 
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socialist countries proved unable to override the system of nation-states.10 Instead, 
ruling communist elites continued to draw on a mixture of communist and nationalist 
principles, presenting themselves simultaneously as the vanguards of the working 
classes as well as the vanguards of nations.  
 
This article examines how these heterogeneous frameworks of reference – nationalist, 
transnationalist, and communist – affected the perceptions of imperial legacies in the 
North-eastern Adriatic in the post-War-War-II period. The analysis is limited to the 
years between 1947 and 1954, which allows us to examine the appropriations of 
imperial pasts at a point when the international alliance of socialist states was still 
rather firmly in place, as well as their subsequent transformation following 
Yugoslavia’s expulsion from the Cominform in 1948. The time-frame also coincides 
with the period of existence of the Free Territory of Trieste (FTT), a short-lived 
political formation covering a patch of territory around the port-town of Trieste/Trst,11 
claimed by both Italy and Tito’s Yugoslavia. The post-World-War-II border dispute 
that resulted in the creation of FTT has a long and turbulent history, stretching back 
into the nineteenth century.12 In the years following World War II, the North-eastern 
Adriatic  acquired a wider strategic significance: poised on the southern end of what 
came to be known as the Iron Curtain, its fate appeared too important to be left to 
Italy and Yugoslavia alone. After prolonged negotiations, most of the North-eastern 
Adriatic was carved up between the two neighbouring states, while the remaining 
patch of territory, comprising Trieste and its immediate surroundings, was declared a 
Free Territory. The FTT was divided into two zones, controlled respectively by the 
Allied Military Government (Zone A) and the Yugoslav army (Zone B). In line with 
the early Cold War politics of containment, Zone A came to function as the last 
                                                 
10
 Paul Shoup, ‘Communism, Nationalism, and the Growth of the Communist Community of Nations 
after World War II,’ The American Political Science Review 56, No. 4 (1952) : 886-898. 
11
 When first mentioned, all toponyms from the region are provided both in their Italian and in their 
Slovenian or Croatian variant. In all subsequent mentions, only the variant in what is now the majority 
language is used.    
12
 For synthetic overviews see Cattaruzza, op. cit., and Rolf Wörsdörfer, Krisenherd Adria 1915-1955: 
Konstruktion und Artikulation des Nationalen im italienisch-jugoslawischen Grenzraum (Paderborn, 
München, Wien and Zürich: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2004). 
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bulwark against Soviet expansionism,13 while at the same time, Zone B was becoming 
ever more incorporated into the Yugoslav economic, political and ideological 
system.14 After the electoral defeat of the Communist Party in Italy in 1948, and 
Yugoslavia’s expulsion from Cominform later in the same year, the double-headed 
threat of Soviet expansion into Italian territory suddenly receded. In 1954, FTT was 
finally dismembered and the two zones annexed to the two neighbouring states.  
 
To gain insight into local appropriations of imperial legacies between 1947 and 1954, 
the chapter examines discourses appearing in the major regional and minority 
newspapers published at the time, including Italian, Slovenian as well as Croatian 
ones. These comprise newspapers published in the Yugoslav part of the North-eastern 
Adriatic , including the Croatian daily Riječki list (1947-1954), later renamed into 
Novi list (1954-), the Slovenian bi-weekly Nova Gorica (1947-1953), later renamed 
into Primorske novice (1953-), and the Italian daily La Voce del Popolo (1945-). 
Together with the Slovenian bi-weekly Slovenski Jadran (1952-1963), published in 
Zone B, and the Slovenian minority daily Primorski Dnevnik (1945-), published in 
Zone A, most of these newspapers had their roots in clandestine antifascist, pro-
communist periodicals established during the Second World War.15 After the 
formation of Yugoslavia, they were all under close political control and supervision, 
and represented the identities and boundaries of the North-eastern Adriatic in broadly 
similar ways, mostly arguing for the annexation of FTT or at least the Yugoslav-
controlled Zone B to Yugoslavia. In contrast, La Voce Libera (1945-1949), Giornale 
di Trieste (1947-1954), and Giornale’s successor Il Piccolo (1954-) – all published in 
Zone A – provide insight into Italian, pro-Western appropriations of imperial legacies 
at the time. Although affiliated to political groups at different ends of the political 
                                                 
13
 Raoul Pupo, Guerra e dopoguerra al confine orientale d’Italia (1938-1954) (Udine: Del Bianco 
Editore, 1999), 161. 
14
 See Nevenka Troha, ‘Ukrepi jugoslovanskih oblasti v conah B Julijske krajine in Svobodnega 
tržaškega ozemlja in Italijani na Koprskem,’ Annales – Series historia et sociologia 10, No. 1 (2000): 
203-216.  
15
 See Bojan Pavletič, Primorski dnevnik 1945-1995 (Trst, Gorica and, Čedad: Družba za založniške 
pobude d.d., 1995); Branko Marušič ,’Povojni slovenski tisk,’ in Zbornik Primorske – 50 let (Koper: 
Primorske novice, 1997); Božidar Novak, Hrvatsko novinarstvo u 20. stoljeću (Zagreb: Golden 
marketing – Tehnička knjiga, 1995), 344-347. 
This is a pre-print version. Final version: Mihelj, S. (2011) ‘Imperial Myths between 
Nationalism and Communism: Appropriations of Imperial Legacies in the North-
eastern Adriatic during the Early Cold War’, European Historical Quarterly 41(4): 
634-56. 
 
 6 
spectrum, 16 both newspapers unequivocally supported the annexation of Trieste to 
Italy, and represented the voices of those Triestines who ‘recognised themselves in 
[...] the Western, Atlantic, and European camp’.17 While the sample is not exhaustive, 
it does cover the most widely distributed newspapers in the region,18 and thus also the 
most widespread appropriations of imperial pasts circulating in the public realm at the 
time.  
 
La Voce Libera, Giornale di Trieste and Il Piccolo: Imperial pasts as roots of 
Italian civiltà and Western democracy 
 
The imperial legacies of Rome and Venice historically played a paramount role in 
Italian perceptions of the north-eastern Adriatic and of the Balkan Peninsula as a 
whole. Narratives of uninterrupted continuity stretching back to the times of the 
Roman Empire formed a crucial part of the Italian myth of origins, and served as the 
basis for irredentist claims to the north-eastern Adriatic.19 In the twentieth century, the 
myth of Rome became one of the pillars of Fascist doctrine,20 and again reinvigorated 
Italian territorial pretensions in Istria and Dalmatia. Perceptions of the Venetian 
heritage of the north-eastern Adriatic served a similar purpose. Advocates of Italian 
territorial claims to Dalmatia participating at the Paris peace conference in 1919 used 
                                                 
16
 La Voce Libera was affiliated to the Venezia Giulia National Liberation Committee (Comitato di 
Liberazione Nazionale di Venezia Giulia), an anti-fascist, left-leaning organisation rooted in the pro-
Italian antifascist struggle in the region. Giornale di Trieste, on the other hand, was in direct 
ideological and editorial continuity with the (in)famous daily Il Piccolo, which was known for its 
support to the Fascist cause. Although declaratively distancing itself from the far right, and leaning 
towards the political programme of Christian Democrats (Democrazia Christiana), Giornale di Trieste 
continued to perpetuate some of the core irredentist and Fascist arguments. See Luciano Becker, 
Roberto de Rosa and Silvano Benvenuti, ‘La Voce Libera,’  and Cesare Vetter, ‘Il Giornale di Trieste,’ 
both in Nazionalismo e neofascismo nella lotta politica al confine orientale 1945-75 (Trieste: La 
Editoriale Libreria, 1977), 27-61 and 112-142 respectively. 
17
 Guido Botteri (ed.), Un secolo un giornale: Il Piccolo, 1881-1981 (Trieste: Società Editrice 
Triestina, 1981), 43. 
18
 Other potentially interesting sources include the independentist daily Corriere di Trieste (1945-
1958), which regularly invoked the Habsburg myth to harness support for the continued existence of 
FTT, the pro-Soviet newspapers such as the official outlet of the regional branch of the Italian 
Communist Party, Il Lavoratore (1945-1964) and its Slovenian counterpart Delo (1949), and the 
Slovenian weekly Demokracija (1947-1963), tied to the Catholic and liberal fractions within the 
Slovenian minority in Zone A.  
19
 Gino Bandelli, ‘Per una storia del mito di Roma al confine orientale: Istri e Romani dell’età 
dell’irredentismo,’ Quaderni Giuliani di storia 15, No 1 (1994): 163-175. 
20
 Romke Visser, ‘Fascist Doctrine and the Cult of the Romanità,’ Journal of Contemporary History 27 
(1992): 5-22. 
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 7 
references to the Venetian past of the region to buttress their demands.21 Throughout 
the 1920s, various public events and cultural products presented the north-eastern 
Adriatic as an inalienable part of the ‘three Venices’ (tree Venezie), i.e. historical 
Venetian provinces and therefore allegedly integral parts of modern-day Italy.22  
 
This emphasis on the imperial and ancient heritage of the north-eastern Adriatic is not 
unique to Italy. It coincides with other Western images of the eastern Adriatic coast 
and the wider Balkan Peninsula as heirs of ancient civilisations.23 Architecture in 
particular played a paramount role in these perceptions, functioning as a material 
proof of the ancient past: Roman amphitheatres and arches, Venetian churches and 
houses were regularly presented as material remnants of ancient glory.24 However, 
unlike other Western perceptions, Italian images of the eastern Adriatic coast 
normally also used these remnants to buttress claims about the essential Italianness of 
the region. Large-scale excavations of Roman ruins taking place across Italy in both 
the late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries formed a physical counterpart to 
the symbolic ‘excavation’ of what was perceived as Italy’s own glorious past. In line 
with this alleged continuity, the uncovering of Roman ruins in Trieste functioned as a 
proof of city’s Italianness, and thus of Italy’s historic right to the city. The ancient 
ruins along the eastern Adriatic coast, such as the Roman amphitheatre in Pula/Pola in 
Istria and the Diocletian’s Palace in Split/Spalato in Damatia served similar purposes.  
 
Besides functioning as a crucial reference point for Italian claims to the eastern 
Adriatic coast, the Venetian era also gave rise to an influential legacy of perceptions, 
which were incorporated into Italian nationalist discourse and later became a crucial 
part of the Fascist doctrine. At the hart of this legacy of perceptions lies the notion of 
civiltà, which conveniently blends the modern ideas of culture, civilisation and 
civility. In the ideological universe of Enlightenment Venice, the eastern shore of the 
                                                 
21
 Larry Wolff, Venice and the Slavs: The Discovery of Dalmatia in the Age of Enlightenment 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), 353-355. 
22
 Maura Hametz, Making Trieste Italian, 1918-1954 (Royal Historical Society, 2005), 92-93. 
23
 John B. Allcock, ‘Constructing the Balkans,’ in Black Lambs and Grey Falcons: Women Travellers 
in the Balkans, edited by John B. Allcock and Antonia Young (Bradford: Bradford University Press, 
1991), 181-189.  
24
 Ibid., 181-182. 
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 8 
Adriatic was poised mid-way between barbarism and civilisation, and as such called 
for an enlightened intervention of Venetian civiltà.25 The civilising mission was 
envisaged as spreading from the urban, Italian-speaking coastal settlements into the 
rural hinterland, mostly populated by the supposedly lazy, irrational and ferocious 
‘Morlacchi’ – a now non-existent category referring to populations speaking Slavic 
languages.26  
 
In the nineteenth century, the notion of the enlightening, assimilatory civiltà became 
one of the founding stones of Italian national identity, and gradually assumed racist 
overtones as well, albeit initially of a cultural rather than biological kind. In the eyes 
of Italian nationalists, nothing prevented ‘Slavs’ from becoming civilised, yet they 
could do so only by embracing Italian civilisation or culture.27 In the twentieth 
century, this racialised form of the notion of civiltà was incorporated the Fascist 
perception of Italy’s imperial past and its present mission. Fascists often spoke of 
Dalmatia, as well as the north-eastern shore of the Adriatic Sea, as a land in need of 
being civilised from the Italians, or singled out particular cities in Dalmatia as 
superior to other towns that were permeated by barbarism, low levels of hygiene, and, 
more generally, ‘balkanism’.28 The aristocracy of the ‘new’ Fascist civilisation was 
believed to be morally responsible for saving humanity, including the inhabitants of 
the Balkans, from the combined threats of democracy, communism and Jewish 
conspiracy, thereby also securing the ‘vital space’ for the expansion of the Fascist 
                                                 
25
 Ibid., 324ff. 
26
 Ibid., 132-138. The roots of Venetian contempt for inhabitants of the eastern shore of the Adriatic 
may go as far as the ancient Roman and Greek perceptions of ancient inhabitants of this region, the 
Illyrians, as ‘savage’ and ‘barbarian’. According to John J. Wilkes, these ancient stereotypes may have 
contributed to the lasting neglect for Illyrians in most versions of ancient history. John J. Wilkes, The 
Illyrians (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), 4-5. 
27
 Pamela Ballinger, ‘“Authentic Hybrids” in the Balkan Borderlands’, Current Anthropology 45, No. 1 
(2004): 34-36; Glenda Sluga, ‘Narrating Difference and Defining the Nation in Late Nineteenth and 
Early Twentieth Century ‘Western’ Europe,’ European Review of History 9, No. 2 (2004): 194-195. 
28
 Wolff, op. cit., 355; Glenda Sluga, ‘Identità nazionale Italiana e fascismo: alieni, allogeni e 
assimilazione sul confine nord-orientale italiano,’ in Nazionalismi di frontiera: Identità contrapposte 
sull’ Adriatico nord-orientale 1850-1950, edited by Marina Cattaruzza (Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 
2005), 171-202. 
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New Order.29 These arguments served to justify increasingly ruthless forms of 
Italianisation of Slovenians and Croatians in the region.30  
 
Elements of imperial legacies outlined in previous paragraphs were regularly 
appearing on the pages of both La Voce Libera and Giornale di Trieste, as well as in 
Giornale’s successor Il Piccolo. All three newspapers shared an unambiguous 
commitment to the Italian national cause and supported Italian territorial claims to 
Istria and Dalmatia. The opening issue of Giornale di Trieste presented the daily as 
‘above all an Italian newspaper’, which intends to ‘correspond with the exigencies of 
a population that is largely Italian in terms of culture, language and sentiment’.31 The 
understanding of Italianness as an attribute linked to culture, language and sentiment 
– rather than ethnic or racial descent – clearly fits the model of assimilatory Italian 
nationalism established in the nineteenth century and exploited by fascism. At the 
same time, it also provides the basis for Giornale’s belief that the ‘new territorial 
arrangement of Trieste’ is merely temporary, potentially open to revision once the 
post-war confusion has settled down. The opening editorial of La Voce Libera 
followed a similar ideological pattern. By writing about ‘the love we bring to our 
Trieste, to the tormented Julian lands and to the whole of Italy’, it clearly signalled its 
belief in the Italian character of both Trieste and the north-eastern Adriatic as a 
whole.32 In line with this belief, the presence of the Yugoslav administration was seen 
as ‘temporary’, and the Yugoslav solution to the Trieste problem was described as 
‘unilateral, clearly opposed to designations of history and culture’. In a manner 
characteristic of Italian nationalism since the late nineteenth century, La Voce was 
thus using culture and history to delegitimate alternative territorial claims to the 
region – in this case claims put forward by Tito’s Yugoslavia. 
 
As several articles published in the three newspapers made clear, the ‘designations of 
history and culture’ referred to in the opening issue of La Voce were rooted in the 
                                                 
29
 Davide Rodogno, ‘Italian Soldiers in the Balkans: The Experience of the Occupation (1941-1943),’ 
Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans 6, No. 2 (2004): 125-144. 
30
 For a brief overview of assimilatory policies in the region under fascism see Cattaruzza, op. cit., 168-
181. 
31
 Giornale di Trieste, 6 March 1947, 1. 
32
 La Voce Libera, 23 July 1945, 1. 
This is a pre-print version. Final version: Mihelj, S. (2011) ‘Imperial Myths between 
Nationalism and Communism: Appropriations of Imperial Legacies in the North-
eastern Adriatic during the Early Cold War’, European Historical Quarterly 41(4): 
634-56. 
 
 10 
perceived continuity that linked modern-day Italy to the Roman and Venetian 
empires. These perceptions of imperial legacies came particularly clearly to the fore 
in the reporting on developments in Dalmatia and parts of Istria under Yugoslav rule. 
In these reports, various cultural traits, especially architectural ones, played the dual 
role noted by Pamela Ballinger in her analysis of Italian exile memories and 
perceptions of Istria: they functioned both as the enduring imprint of Italian civiltà, 
and as a symbol of its destruction and decay caused by hostile invaders.33 Depictions 
of cultural remnants of glorious Roman and Venetian pasts were thus regularly 
contrasted with the foreign, alien, and hence illegitimate presence of Yugoslavs.34 In 
the eyes of Il Piccolo, something completely ludicrous was taking place in the part of 
the north-eastern Adriatic belonging to Yugoslavia: ‘in a land whose Roman, 
Venetian and Italian configuration and its unbroken progression of a two-thousand-
year old civilisation could only be changed by a tectonic shift which would swallow 
it’, everything was being done to ‘erase’ Italian culture.35 This statement leaves little 
doubt as to where the capital proof of the Italianness of the region lies: it lives in the 
indelible, two-thousand years long presence of Roman and Venetian legacies, now 
being destroyed by the Yugoslavs.  
 
Giornale shared a very similar attitude towards Yugoslav presence in the region. In a 
characteristic comment accompanying the photo reportage from Pula, the town’s 
Roman amphitheatre was used to symbolise the towering and timeless presence of 
Italianness, and as such provided a stark contrast to what was presented as a pitifully 
small and lonely group of pro-Yugoslav protesters:  
On Monday September 15, at 14:30, a lens captured this snapshot in Pula: 
the passing, in the middle of a deserted city, of a thin grouplet of pro-
Yugoslav ‘campaigners’, who came to the city to greet Pula on the 
occasion of Tito soldiers’ holiday. With a magnifying lens we counted 42 
persons: 17 men, 13 women, 12 children, and 4 flags, 2 bikes and one 
accordion. All around emptiness, no spectators; silence, desolation. 
                                                 
33
 Ballinger, History in Exile, op. cit., 175ff.  
34
 Similar contrasts can be found in Western representations of luxurious material objects used in the 
Balkans. As a rule, inhabitants of the Balkans were presented as uncivilised barbarians, unable to use 
such objects properly. See Božidar Jezernik, Wild Europe: The Balkans in the Gaze of Western 
Travellers (London: SAQI, in association with the Bosnian Institute, 2004), 43-46.  
35
 Il Piccolo, 27 Oct 1954, 1. 
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Something, yes, was overlooking the little, confused caravan, almost 
crushing it:  her majesty the Arena. The past was watching from its empty 
eye sockets, a timeless past: the Italian eternity of the region.
36
   
Such images of emptiness and desolation were a standard element of Giornale’s 
depiction of Istrian and Dalmatian towns and cities, and were often accompanied by 
emotional, nostalgic recollections of the vibrant, joyful golden age of Italy’s presence 
in the region. The land left behind by the exiles was presented as ‘an almost deserted 
country, emptied, dead. No flag on the windows of houses, taverns and inns 
deserted’.37 Once the exile is over, claimed another article, ‘all that will be left will be 
the pine forests, deserted suburbs, lost valleys, where the autumn sky is stretched 
across the sunset, red and bloody like our mutilated country’.38 
 
Similar rhetorical constructs of past and present, joy and desolation, life and death, 
could be found also in La Voce. A photo-reportage from Zara/Zadar, one of the major 
urban settlements on the Dalmatian coast, was composed exclusively of images of 
ruins, decaying buildings and empty streets.39 As one of the graphically most 
prominent subtitles suggested, the images represented a ‘Venetian city’, which is 
‘dying in a long and grey agony’. According to the reporter, the city looked ‘as if 
being recently bombarded, with the physiognomy of its buildings deranged’. As the 
rest of the reportage made clear, that physiognomy was Venetian, and its survival was 
allegedly dependent on the continued presence of Italy and Italians in the region. 
Without that presence, without the ‘activity of an industrious, noble population’, 
Zadar’s ‘lively shores, its hard-working factories, its Venetian lanes’ were no longer 
there, and had no hope of returning. Abandoned by Italy and Italians, the remains of 
the Venetian architecture were, in the eyes of the reporter, only lifeless shells emptied 
of their true content: ‘Everything in this beautiful Venetian city is eviscerated. Only 
the bell tower is standing erect, reaching to the skies, like a huge forefinger that seems 
to be invocating something that is no longer there: Italy.’ Following the model 
employed in several other articles, the reportage thus used Venetian architecture as 
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the symbol of Zadar’s true essence, namely Italianness. Bereft of its enlivening and 
industrious spirit, the city was bound to decay and die.  
 
As evident from the above, neither La Voce nor the Giornale or its successor Il 
Piccolo allowed for the prospect of Roman and Venetian heritage being shared and 
kept alive by non-Italian inhabitants of the region. Their depictions of Istrian and 
Dalmatian towns clearly signalled that the true heirs of Roman and Venetian legacies 
were those who left and sought refuge in Italy: ‘The exiles […] remember the work of 
defence carried out for thousands of years by Istrians and Dalmatians in the name of 
Italy, in lands now ceded to the foreigner’.40 The only hope left was tied to the few 
Italians staying in the region, ‘brothers’ who, as the then Italian president put it in one 
of his speeches, ‘are being unjustly torn away from the arms of [their] ancient 
mother’.41 In contrast, the Slavic inhabitants of Istria and Dalmatia were regularly 
denied any claim to ‘autochthonous’ presence on the eastern shores of the Adriatic, 
and were instead presented strictly as ‘foreigners’ and ‘newcomers’. The symbolic 
appropriations of these remains by the Yugoslav authorities were ridiculed and seen 
as a further confirmation of the unjustness of Yugoslav rule in the region. For 
example, when the Yugoslav communist authorities, upon first entering Pula, covered 
the ancient Roman Arch of the Sergii in long red drapes, this was interpreted as a sign 
of their inability to face the true splendour of Roman monuments – a splendour that, 
implied the commentator, was reminding them of the true nature of the town.42  
 
Perceptions of imperial legacies discussed so far represent variations on Italian 
nationalist imagery established well before World War II. However, while drawing on 
established nationalist perceptions, La Voce and Giornale were also engaged in 
refashioning them according to the exigencies of Cold War politics. This rhetoric was 
increasingly giving pride of place to supranational allegiances rather than national 
interests alone. The Italians of the north-eastern Adriatic were thus seen not only as 
bearers of a two-thousands-years-old Italian civiltà, but also as defenders of 
democracy and freedom of the West, fighting the oppression and barbarity of the 
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communist, totalitarian East. The old opposition of the civilised coast and the 
untamed hinterland, of Italian civiltà and the barbaric Slavs of the Balkans, was now 
weaved into the dichotomy of the liberal West and the illiberal East. Hence, ‘the dear 
cities from Zadar to Pula, from Fiume/Rijeka to Parenzo/Poreč’ were not only torn 
away from they Italian ‘Fatherland’, but at the same time also ‘disappeared from the 
scope of Western civilisation, falling into a night without history’,43 and were 
‘suffering under the yoke of Yugo-communist barbarism’.44  
 
However, in the eyes of La Voce and Giornale, ‘the Yugo-communists’ where not the 
only threat that the Italian civiltà and the democratic civilisation of the West were 
facing in the north-eastern Adriatic. Occasionally, the Allied administration of Zone 
A would join the ranks of enemies as well. Similarly as hostile depictions of 
Yugoslavs, these representations occasionally drew on Italy’s Roman and Venetian 
legacies, as well as on the notion of Italian civiltà. On one occasion, Giornale accused 
the Allied administration of disregarding all civil norms, and what is more doing so in 
‘a city that was among the most civilised ones in Italy and Europe’.45 In a similar vein, 
an editorial published in La Voce Libera questioned the policies adopted by the Allied 
forces in the region, and claimed that true democratic liberties could be secured only 
with the return of the FTT to Italy.46 At the very least, argued another article, Italy 
should be involved in the administration of justice in the FTT. The main reason for 
this, reckoned the commentator, lay in Italy’s Roman heritage, in the fact that Italy 
‘gave the world the Roman law’.47  
 
Allies’ apparent disrespect for Italian civiltà was particularly loudly emphasised in 
Giornale’s reporting of mass demonstrations and incidents of violence in the autumn 
of 1953. The demonstrations were sparked by an announcement, issued jointly by the 
United States and Britain on October 8, in which the two Allies informed the parties 
involved that they intend to withdrawn their troops from Zone A of the FTT and hand 
the administration over to Italy. The pro-Italian part of the population, cheer-led by 
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Giornale di Trieste, greeted the prospect of the arrival of Italian troops with 
excitement, organising mass displays of national loyalty. The demonstrations that 
escalated in early November provoked repressive measures on the side of the Allied 
Military Government, and resulted in bloodshed. 48 Giornale was outraged at the 
response of the Allied administration. What was at stake in the incidents, argued one 
of the editorials, were ‘the honour of a western city that prides itself on being 
Christian, the honour of our Allies […], the salvation of a democratic Europe’.49 The 
authorities, argued another article published in Giornale, should be able to recognise 
who the real enemy is: on the one hand, there is ‘a nation that, for the first time, is 
being faced with civilisation, and has to put up with an atheo-communist tyranny’, i.e. 
the Slavs, and on the other hand, there is ‘a nation that, for the greatest part, created 
this same civilisation and diffused it across the world’, i.e. the Italians.50 The true lines 
of division as seen by Giornale di Trieste are clear: a pious, Christian, civilised and 
democratic nation is being threatened by an atheist, uncivilised nation and its 
totalitarian regime. All the Italian protesters were guilty of, claimed another article, 
was ‘love for Italy in the ideological tradition of Giuseppe Mazzini, who was the first 
one who hoped for a union of peoples and for the birth of a Europe of democratic and 
liberal values which the West has now risen to defend’.51 Not only is the Fascist past 
completely neglected; Italian nationalism itself is presented as the cradle of European 
democracy and liberalism.  
  
In this context, the Allied presence in the city assumed the position that had 
previously been occupied by Italy’s foremost imperial enemy: the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire. Similarly as the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Allies were now seen as 
working in the interests of the Slavs.52 In line with this parallel, those who died or 
were injured in the violent clashes with the police were regarded as heroes, worth of 
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being commemorated together with those who died resisting Habsburg rule. Perhaps, 
argued Giornale, ‘we will soon be able to ask our municipal authorities to add their 
names to the glorious list of those who fell for the liberty of Trieste and the unity of 
the Fatherland’.53 At the same time, the memories of Italian victory in the battle of 
Vittorio Veneto, which marked the final dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, 
was used to fuel the perception of the current settlement of borders in the north-
eastern Adriatic as merely temporary. Sooner or later, claimed Giornale, a new 
Vittorio Veneto was bound to occur, redrawing the eastern border of Italy to fit the 
demands of Italian culture and history. Not even the powers of Habsburg Vienna, 
argued an editorial published in Il Piccolo, ‘were able to damage the centuries-long 
truth’, i.e. the truth of the essential Italianness of the Adriatic region. ‘We,’ declared 
the editorial, ‘believe religiously in the powers of history. […] The Italian civiltà in 
the Adriatic was not a mis-en-scène of a people drunk of its victory, but an 
indestructible product of a centuries-long stratification, which always held up to 
adversities’. Therefore, the Italians left abandoned on the other side of the Iron 
Curtain should keep faith, since nothing could prevent ‘the flag of the fatherland from 
returning to shine brightly where it was planted by the heroes of Vittorio Veneto’.54 In 
the eyes of Il Piccolo, the border dispute between Italy in Tito’s Yugoslavia was thus 
simply yet another chapter in Italy’s perennial struggle against territorial pretensions 
of its eastern neighbours.   
 
The pro-Yugoslav press: between communist and nationalist rejections of 
imperial legacies  
 
On the Yugoslav side, imperial legacies were dealt with in a significantly different 
manner. In line with anti-imperialist convictions of international communism 
prevalent at the time,55 the multiple imperial legacies that left their imprints in 
Yugoslav territories were not glorious models to be emulated in the present, but dark, 
oppressive forces whose heritage should be erased. Together with the ‘new imperialist 
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forces of the West’, these legacies formed an integral part of ‘the forces of the past’ or 
‘retrograde elements’ that Yugoslavia had chosen to overcome by embarking on a 
socialist revolution.56 Underpinning this rejection of the past was a narrative of 
modernity that reversed some of the core ideological foundations of westocentric 
narratives found in La Voce Libera and Giornale di Trieste. This pro-Yugoslav 
narrative still retained the characteristic opposition between the modern, civilised Self 
and the backward, primitive Other57 – now appearing in the form of an antagonism 
between ‘progressive’ and ‘retrograde’ forces – yet rejected the idea that civilisation 
and progress are rooted in a glorious past, be it imperial or of another kind. Tradition 
was not something to be nourished and preserved, but an obstacle to revolution, 
‘weighing like a nightmare on the brains of the living’ and preventing them from 
revolutionising the world without ‘conjuring up the spirits of the past’.58 Modelling 
the present and future on an imperial past and constructing a myth of origin stretching 
back to antiquity, as Italian nationalism did, was therefore out of question. Instead, 
progress was to be oriented strictly to the future, and necessitated a myth of origins 
centred on a revolutionary break with the things past, including a break with imperial 
legacies.  
 
For pro-Yugoslav newspapers, the annexation of most of Istria and later also Zone B 
to Yugoslavia represented exactly such a break. If, in the eyes of La Voce Libera and 
Giornale, the dismemberment of FTT pushed Istria into a ‘darkness without history’, 
a period of destruction, death, and barbarism, pro-Yugoslav outlets painted the same 
event as a symbolic rebirth, a beginning of ‘new times’, full of hope and light. With 
the annexation of Koper/Capodistria to Yugoslavia, wrote one article, ‘the sun finally 
began to shine above this town’, and the annexation was accompanied by ‘hopes for 
the beginning of new times’.59 The very same Venetian and Roman legacies that for 
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La Voce Libera and Giornale functioned as the basis of Italian civiltà and the 
continuing prosperity of the region were here seen exclusively as one among the 
many ‘dark forces of the past’, responsible for prolonged ‘enslavement’ and 
‘oppression’. An article published in Slovenski Jadran for example described the fate 
of a village under various ‘occupiers’, including the Venetian and Habsburg Empires, 
and glorified ‘the centuries-old struggle’ of local inhabitants against their 
‘oppressors’.60  
 
The various imperialist Others, and particularly so Fascist Italy, were also the ones to 
be blamed for the poor economic and social conditions in the north-eastern Adriatic, 
as well as Yugoslavia as a whole. As one article put it: ‘It wasn’t easy to take over the 
heritage of Fascist Italy, which was oppressing the people […] in some places as 
much as 60% of the population was illiterate, all thanks to a state which is boasting a 
cultural tradition going back two thousand years’.61 ‘Our working people’, claimed 
another article, ‘were consciously and calculatingly diverted from theatre […] and 
deliberately entertained by farce and comedy to turn them away from political and 
social problems’.62 Even the irresponsible exploitation of natural resources such as 
forests, for example, was seen as a consequence of similarly irresponsible behaviour 
of ‘foreign imperialists’ and ‘capitalists’.63 The ‘new times’ that were to begin with 
the annexation to Yugoslavia were therefore premised on ‘doing away with the murky 
past and harmful consequences of the centuries-long enslavement’.64  
 
In mobilising support for the rejection of imperial legacies, post-World-War-II 
Yugoslavia could have of course drawn on a well established tradition of nationalist 
perceptions that saw the Habsburg and Ottoman empires as ‘prisons of nations’, and 
painted the past in terms of a struggle between South Slav national liberation 
movements and imperial oppression.65 However, Yugoslavia was itself a multinational 
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state, and had just experienced a period of bloody nationalist conflicts, many of them 
fought among members of Yugoslav nations themselves. In such a context, building 
on nationalist perceptions of imperial legacies alone could have been profoundly 
unsettling. Furthermore, the notion of a South Slav brotherhood of nations, drawn 
together by commonalties of race and culture and joined in the fight against imperial 
oppressors, was tainted by memories of failed Yugoslav nation-building in the 
interwar period. Interwar Yugoslav elites were heavily involved in an attempt to 
create a synthetic Yugoslav culture, based on the belief that Yugoslav peoples, despite 
being culturally, linguistically and religiously different, in fact constituted a single 
national whole.66 Yet this vision became intertwined with intra-Yugoslav nationalist 
tensions and came to be perceived by many non-Serbs as a thinly disguised attempt to 
Serbianize the country. Post-Word-War-II Yugoslav rejection of imperial legacies 
therefore had to be established on a footing that diverged from inter-war Yugoslav 
nationalist narratives of the past.  
 
The break with inter-war Yugoslavism was achieved in two main ways. First, the 
emphasis on ‘unity’ was balanced by an emphasis on equality or ‘brotherhood’ of all 
Yugoslav nations. This joint emphasis on ‘brotherhood and unity’ constituted the 
main pillar of the communist Yugoslav civil religion,67 and helped disentangle the 
new Yugoslavism from any pretensions of creating a unified Yugoslav nation. As 
such, it was believed to guard the new Yugoslavia against the ‘mistake’ purportedly 
committed by both its interwar predecessor and the Habsburg Empire, namely the 
attempt to forcibly assimilate all peoples into one single nation.68 The second element 
that was aimed at securing a clean break with pre-World-War anti-imperialist 
sentiments was the marrying of anti-imperialist struggle to class struggle. This gesture 
effectively brought the South Slav national liberation struggle in line with the 
international liberation struggle led by the working classes. According to the 
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Yugoslav myth of origins, this union was forged during the World War II, and found 
its expression in the Anti-Fascist Yugoslav People’s Liberation Struggle, led by the 
Yugoslav Partisans.69 In line with this myth, the past anti-imperial struggles of South 
Slavs were now reinterpreted as struggles that were not led only by oppressed nations 
fighting anti-national regimes, but also by exploited working classes revolting against 
the bourgeoisie. Interwar Yugoslavia, went the argument, was unable to resolve these 
conflicts, and instead exacerbated them, largely due to continuing nationalist 
antagonisms between different national bourgeoisies and capitalist exploitation, but 
also thanks to the continuing influence of other ‘forces of the past’:  feudal 
relationships, the Church, and continuing attempts of imperial forces to extend their 
spheres of influence.70 Following this argument, the true solution to these conflicts 
could not be found solely in the continuation of the South Slav national liberation 
struggle. Instead, this struggle had to be intertwined with the international struggle of 
the working classes against both domestic capitalists as well as imperial forces. While 
references to South Slav and even pan-Slav brotherhood continued to feature in 
Yugoslav public discourse, including Tito’s own speeches, they were normally used 
to mobilise support for the ‘antifascist’ and therefore ‘anti-imperial’ struggle, which 
was in essence supranational and not limited to South Slavs alone.71  
 
Due to this union of national liberation struggles with the transnational struggle of the 
working classes, Yugoslav ant-imperial myths were based on a blend of nationalist 
and communist perceptions of imperial legacies. Hostile imperial forces, both past 
and present, were therefore not confronted simply with nations, but at the same time 
also with an international alliance of working peoples. This mixture necessitated a 
vision and division of the world that was markedly different from the one encountered 
in La Voce and Il Giornale. From the point of view of La Voce and Il Giornale, the 
world was divided primarily along geo-cultural distinctions, running along the 
concentric lines of nation, race and civilisation, and separating the democratic, liberal 
and civilised nations of the West from the totalitarian, communist and barbaric 
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nations of the East. In contrast, for the pro-Yugoslav newspapers, the main lines of 
division were cutting across, and thereby dislodging, geo-cultural alliances and 
divisions, pitting a transnational alliance of working peoples against an equally 
transnational coalition of imperialist, capitalist forces. Instead of being divided into 
two blocks, the world as seen through the lens of La Voce del Popolo was therefore 
divided into two fronts: ‘the front of the imperialist instigators of war’ on the one 
hand, and ‘the huge front of peoples of all countries who want the peace’ on the other 
hand. The latter included not only ‘the invincible Soviet Union, the new Yugoslavia, 
Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, the democratic forces of Greece 
and Hungary’, but also  ‘the great majority of the people of America, England, 
France, Italy and all other countries not only in Europe, but across the whole world’.72 
The FTT was fitted into the same interpretive framework. A commentary published in 
Slovenski Jadran saw it as ‘an artificial creation, created out of imperialist hatred of 
the new Yugoslavia’,73 while another, published in Primorski dnevnik, described it as 
‘a stronghold for various imperialist plans’, designed to ‘hinder the development of 
democratic forces […] in Italy’.74 Contrary to the vision propounded by La Voce and 
Giornale, the unjust settlement established by the FTT was not down to its failure to 
meet national principles, and therefore make polity coincide with nationality, but 
stemmed from its functioning as an obstacle to the anti-imperialist struggle.   
 
The belief in the inextricable relationship between the anti-imperialist struggle of 
nations and the anti-imperialist struggle of working classes also came to the fore in 
interpretations of the Fascist past. Fascist policies implemented in the region were 
regularly presented as examples of the much broader phenomenon of imperialist 
oppression, directed not only at specific nations but primarily at working classes, 
regardless of their nationality. According to one article, Fascist Italy was responsible 
not only for ‘preventing any education of Slovenians and Croatians’, but also for 
denying education to ‘the Italian working classes’.75 Due to this, anti-fascist resistance 
was inevitably a trans-national phenomenon, finding its expression in the ‘Italo-Slav 
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brotherhood’ and in the common fight against ‘imperialist fascist oppressors’. An 
article published in Riječki list for example recalled how ‘Italian imperial and fascist 
criminals […] destroyed the Croatian Istrian press, […] suppressed Croatian language 
and everything that was dearest and most valued to the Croatian people in Istria’. 
However, argued the author, this oppression did not lead to an all-out anti-Italian 
retaliation:    
In such a situation one could expect that the struggle against Italian 
Fascism, which was the most visible expression of Italy in this region, 
would lead to a struggle against all Italians, especially because Fascism 
only strengthened and widened the old Italian imperial politics in the Julian 
March. However, with the onset of the national liberation struggle the 
things here acquired a different appearance. […] The great idea of 
brotherhood and unity of nations in the struggle against the common 
oppressor, for the common freedom and wellbeing, united both Italians and 
Croatians of Istria into a common front.
76
 
Such official proclamations of Italo-Yugoslav brotherhood of course provide only a 
very partial insight into the struggles taking place on the ground, which often 
contradicted ideas of brotherhood and unity and continued to be fuelled by mutual 
suspicion and nationalist prejudices. Although local newspapers sporadically 
acknowledged the existence of inter-ethnic conflicts and prejudices, these 
acknowledgments were normally accompanied by interpretations that blamed the 
persistence of hatred and violence solely on prior exploitation. Together with 
proclamations of Italo-Yugoslav brotherhood, such justifications of inter-ethnic hatred 
by reference to prior suffering constitute variants of the discourse of negation and 
normalisation that has long dominated the collective memory and official 
historiography on the topic in the former Yugoslavia, and persists in the successor 
states.77 In explaining inter-ethnic violence and migration in the region during and 
after World War II, this discourse has either avoided the issue altogether, or tended to 
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resort to explanatory strategies that presented the movements of populations as largely 
voluntary, fostered by economic pressures and as such embracing not only Italians, 
but also Slovenians and Croats.78 Other factors, such as the discriminatory policies of 
the legal epuration of fascism conducted by the Yugoslav authorities in the region, or 
the persistence of nationalist prejudices, hatred and violence, were either ignored or 
explained away as legitimate reactions to suffering under Fascist rule.  
 
Besides glossing over the everyday realities of interethnic tensions in the region, the 
overwhelming presence of appeals to transnational brotherhood and unity in local pro-
Yugoslav newspapers also provided little insight into the fissures appearing among 
both local and Yugoslav political elites at the time, especially in the period following 
Yugoslavia’s expulsion from the Cominform in 1948. The rift between Tito and Stalin 
was couched in the rhetoric of anti-imperialism, with the Soviet Union now joining 
the range of imperial Others hindering the true progress of humanity. The reports on 
developments in the Soviet Union were now far from the glittering portrayals known 
from the immediate post-war years. Instead, the articles were warning against ‘Soviet 
expansionism’79 and portrayed Soviet elites as the new imperialists who are enjoying a 
luxurious lifestyle while the living conditions of Soviet workers are deteriorating.80 
Following the same interpretive framework, Triestine supporters of the Soviet Union 
were accused of misleading the proletarian mass in Trieste and supporting nationalist, 
imperialist and capitalist aims.81  
 
The break with Soviet Union also marked the beginning of a slight shift in the relative 
weight of nationalist aspirations and class struggle, in favour of the former. Geo-
cultural demarcations were now regularly appearing side-by-side with socio-economic 
ones. Particularly in the realm of foreign policy, Yugoslavia was beginning to adopt a 
new geo-political identity, positioning itself outside of the two ‘imperialist’ blocks, 
belonging neither to the East nor to the West. ‘We,’ argued Tito in a speech given in 
1954, ‘are following our own path into socialism, and we will not allow anyone, 
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neither those in the East nor those in the West, to make us stray away from this 
path’.82 This liminal position allowed Yugoslav leaders to selectively draw on 
elements of imperial legacies associating them with both poles of the symbolic map, 
acting simultaneously as a bridge between, as well as a bulwark of, both the East and 
the West, while at the same time refusing to join either of them. Although 
declaratively rejecting its imperial past, Yugoslavia’s new symbolic positioning was 
unwittingly appropriating one of the key elements of imperial imagery, namely the 
perception of the Self as the bulwark of civilisation, or alternatively as a bridge or 
crossroads of various civilisations.83 This symbolic positioning was to become 
particularly prominent from the late 1950s onwards, when it found its political 
expression in the Non-Aligned Movement.   
 
A similar drift towards geo-cultural and nationalist frameworks was taking place also 
at the local level. Tito’s rift with Stalin effectively contributed to further ethnic 
simplification of the north-eastern Adriatic: it weakened the proponents of the 
Slovenian cause in Zone A, as well as contributed to another wave of political purges 
among Italians in Zone B, this time directed at those disagreeing with Tito’s line.84 
Within Yugoslavia itself, nationalist principles were taking hold as well: Slovenian 
representatives were disappointed by the increasingly real prospect of ‘loosing’ 
Trieste, which among other things meant that Yugoslav borders would not coincide 
with the ethnic distribution of the Slovenian population. In the public realm, these 
stirrings became visible in occasional disagreements between newspaper 
commentaries written by Slovenian communist leaders, and official positions 
defended by Tito,85 as well as in the continuing insistence on the London 
Memorandum as an ultimately unjust, provisional solution. In a speech delivered by 
France Bevk, reproduced in Primorske novice, the Slovenian writer commended the 
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London Memorandum for being the best possible solution under given circumstances, 
and emphasised its role in maintaining peaceful relations with Italy. However, he also 
clearly signalled that the new arrangement of borders was not there to stay, since it 
did not coincide with ethnic distribution: ‘if we look into the more distant future, we 
should not forget that unnatural borders, which unjustly cut into the body of a nation, 
cannot endure’.86 The rejoicing of local Slovenian newspapers at the annexation of 
Zone A to the Republic of Slovenia equally left no doubts as to the primacy of 
nationalist criteria in evaluating the London Memorandum. In a commentary 
published following the dismemberment of FTT, the Slovenian language newspaper 
published in Zone B, tellingly entitled ‘the Slovenian Adriatic’ proudly announced:  
With the definitive annexation of Slovenian Istria to the Federal Peoples’ 
Republic of Yugoslavia, also our most immediate homeland Slovenia 
obtained its window onto the world – the see. For long centuries we have 
been violently and with deliberate thoroughness pushed away from the 
coast, and denied recognition that this is our coast, that we have a right to it 
and that it belongs to nobody else but us.
87
  
The growing presence of nationalist over communist frameworks signalled a trend 
that was to strengthen in the following decades. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Based on the material examined in the paper, we can conclude that the function of 
imperial myths cannot be reduced to nation-building alone, or understood solely with 
reference to nationalist principles of legitimation. Instead, we should distinguish 
between at least two main patterns of uses of imperial legacies, one organised within 
the nationalist framework of reference, the other within the communist one. The 
former was particularly clearly apparent in pro-Italian sources, which regularly 
referred to the Roman and Venetian past of the north-eastern Adriatic to support 
claims about its essentially Italian character, and hence the absurdity of Yugoslav rule 
in the area. At the same time, pro-Italian sources were also appropriating the Cold 
War rhetoric, and presented Italian rule in the region as essential not only for the 
fulfilment of Italian national interests, but also for the protection of Western 
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democracy against Eastern totalitarianism. Nationalist claims were appearing also in 
pro-Yugoslav sources, yet were nearly always presented as coextensive with the 
communist cause. From a pro-Yugoslav perspective, the anti-imperial struggle of 
nations was seen as intrinsically compatible with, and in fact integral to, the anti-
imperial struggle of the working peoples, regardless of nationality. After Tito’s rift 
with Stalin, the emphasis on the transnational alliance of working peoples softened, 
giving way to a symbolic and ideological positioning that was more open to 
nationalist frameworks. Although remaining wedded to the communist anti-imperial 
struggle, this positioning also unwittingly fostered a revival of imperial legacies of 
perceptions, including in particular rhetorical tropes that saw Yugoslavia as a bulwark 
and crossroads of both the East and the West.   
 
